IDENTITY AND KNOWLEDGE
M. A. Muqtedar Khan
This article was
also published as the editorial of the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences,
16, 1 (Spring 1999).
The contemporary intellectual
revival of Muslim societies proposes a profound but problematic relationship between
identity and epistemology, and between self and knowledge. I propose to elucidate this
relationship and its implications by making a fundamental distinction between self and
identity, and showing how there can be many identities but only one self. I begin by
inquiring into the meaning of identity symbols such as "Islam" or
"Muslim" prior to knowledge. For example, what is the meaning and relationship
between identity and knowledge in Islamization of knowledge or Islamic Philosophy? In both
types of knowledge, identity is prior to knowledge in an epistemological, as well as an
ontological sense.
Ontologically we are
suggesting that the existence of Islamic psychology or Islamic philosophy is contingent on
the being of an agency such as Islam or Muslims. Epistemologically we are arguing that
Islam includes a theory of knowledge, and Islamic principles constitute paradigmatic
values from which Islamic psychology or Islamic philosophy can be derived. Clearly, the
prefix Islamic gives an identity to knowledge. In other words, there are certain truth
claims which derive their legitimacy not because their truth is self-evident or rationally
deducible or empirically verifiable, but because they satisfy certain criteria which
establishes their identity as Islamic.
The issue of criteria that
determine what constitutes knowledge (epistemology) is indeed crucial. The first thing
that needs to be resolved is whether these criteria are universally intelligible or are
functions of culture/identity and value systems. I would like to posit that in the realms
of socially meaningful practices it is possible to have relativistic criteria for
determining the validity of social truths. Knowledge about answers to questions such as Is
polygyny or homosexuality acceptable? or Are religious rights more important than economic
rights? may be determined based on criteria that are located within the corpus of
tradition and ethos of a given cultural milieu. This is accomodation of cultural
pluralism. But in the realms of science and philosophy, reasoning and empirical evidence
alone can be the criteria for determining the merit of knowledge claims. If we stray from
this position, and succumb to the postmodern seduction of treating all knowledge claims as
identity narratives, then there will be no science, no philosophy, and no Truth. There
will be nothing universally intelligible. Even God will become a cultural artifact. The
Truth of a universal God necessitates the existence of certain universal intelligibles, to
the understanding of which science and philosophy are dedicated.
Many Muslim thinkers reject
the proposition that knowledge about things in this world can be produced through reason
and/or empirical observations alone and seek a missing Islamic ingredient that would
interact with observed data and reason to produce Islamic knowledge whose veracity would
be beyond doubt. I think this claim is based on the false premise that Western knowledge,
especially social science, is purely based on reason and/or observation. And since the
current outcome of this knowledge is an immoral West, Muslim thinkers tend to reject
reason and observation as sole criteria of determining the merit of knowledge claims, and
search for some magical Islamic ingredient that would sanitize (Islamize) reason and
observation.
We must recognize that where
reason and observation rule as in natural science, the West does produce significant
results. But when it comes to political, social, economic, and moral issues, the many
failures of the present West are a testimony to the fact that its triumphs in the natural
sciences are not replicated in the social sciences. It is my conviction that such is the
case because in the social arena, Western scholars too allow their identity (based on
secular humanism and anthropocentrism) to corrupt their understanding. They allow their
politics to implicate their social sciences. Therefore, we must be very careful before we
allow Western discourses the claim that they are based purely on reason and/or
observation.
Consider for a moment the
methodology of the Qur’an. It does not ask us to believe in itself or in God because
it says so. The Qur’an is full of exhortations to think and reflect upon the signs of
God in text as well as in nature. It asks us to look at the planets and reflect upon their
laws of motion. It recommends that we know God and understand his laws through observation
of the order in nature. The Qur’an demands that we use our ‘aql
(reason/intellect) to reach the truth. It also expects us to infer lessons from history
and from the experiences of civilizations that preceded us (Ilm-ul-Sunan). In some
places God challenges us to bring forward proof if we disagree with him. The mood in the
Qur’an is completely scientific and deeply amenable to the idea of Truth as
verifiable and intelligible through reason and observation. The Muslim faith is not a
belief in things unintelligible to reason or science. It is a faith, which is more like
considered judgment. Indeed, it would be un-Qur’anic to underestimate the importance
of reason and observation in knowing. A Muslim is not a just a believing being but also a
knowing being. Indeed, the "belief" is a function of knowledge.
Let us now return to Islamic
social science and Islamic philosophy. When we use identity symbols prior to knowledge,
are we stating that these types of knowledge are not subject to universal verification? If
external verification of any type, empirical or rational is not the criteria for
determining the merit of knowledge claims, then does not knowledge become ideology? It is
like saying that in order to see the truth in Islamic philosophy or Islamic psychology you
must believe in Islam. What then is the difference between philosophy and theology or
social science and theology?
Before we explore the
relationship between identity and knowledge let us scrutinize the idea of identity itself.
Identity is, in many ways, our direct or mediated understanding of who we are. Who we are
can be understood in individual as well as collective terms. When we indicate to ourselves
who we are, and this is usually accomplished by attributing to ourselves meanings that
give us "distinctions of worth," we are creating a self-identity. When we
indicate to others who we are, this is usually accomplished by emphasizing difference,
we create a strategic identity. When we indicate ourselves to others but seek to emphasize
commonality (identity) and not difference, we create collective identities.
There are at least three
levels at which identity is understood in the discussion above. Self-identity results when
the subject and object are identical. This is knowledge of who we are that is unmediated
by strategic context and other existing identities. While all other forms of identities
are constructed, self-identity is essential. Thus, when a person claims to be an
Indian-American-Sunni-Hanafi Muslim, the person claims to owe allegiance to multiple
identities. This person may also choose to be only an Indian, or only an American, or only
a Muslim. Indeed, under various circumstances the person may consciously choose to
emphasize one identity over another. Nevertheless, whatever identity the person may choose
to identify with at any given time, his or her self-knowledge remains unchanged. Thus,
regardless of what the person chooses to introduce him or herself as, the person’s
"self-identity," the "I" that speaks to the I is the same.
All other identities are
really strategic, contextual, and contingent. They are dependent on the "other"
in contrast to whom the self is defined. For example, let us consider the following
identities. An Arab essentially means that the subject is not a Persian or a European or
anything else (ajami). When an Arab-Christian says he is an Arab-Christian he is
choosing to particularly distinguish himself from Arab-Muslims. Thus, when one asserts
self-identity, one simultaneously distances oneself from "other" identities. The
conof identity is a consequence of emphasizing difference. Collective identities
are the result of the opposite process. Collective identities undermine difference
and emphasize identity.
These types of identities are
instrumental and strategic because they are a function of how the other is perceived or
positioned. For example, if an Arab Christian seeks to identify with a European Christian,
he emphasizes identity and suggests, "We are both Christians," to express
collective identity. If, however, he chooses to distance himself from the European
Christian he emphasizes difference and says, "I am an Arab and the other is
not."
Based upon the above
discussion, I would like to argue that, while we are capable of possessing multiple
identities, we have only one self—the "I" that I am always aware of, no
matter what identity I choose to deploy in a given sociopolitical context. From the
discussion above we have also learned that identities are defined in contrast to others.
But how is self defined? The essential self, that which is distinct from constructed
identities, the "I" that one refers to in knowledge of the self, is recognized
in opposition to God who is the other in this equation. I think that when I assert
"I," I am basically stating that I am not God. Thus in a very profound sense,
the assertion of the primordial self is the accomplishment of two acts of truth. When we
claim that I exist and I have a self, I am actually asserting that I am not God, and that
there is a God/Creator whose creation I am. Since God is eternal, unchanging and absolute,
the self that is posited in contradistinction to God is also eternal, unchanging and
absolute. In a beautiful way the relationship between the self and its creator at once
includes identity as well as difference. To assert that the self cannot
exist without the other (God) is the profoundest expression of identity, but to
recognize that the self and the other belong to different ontological categories, creator
and created, is to recognize a profound and unparalleled difference.
The postmodern dilemma of
order in a world of multiple identities is resolvable by recognizing that while there are
many identities, there is only one self. Identities are constructed through historical and
cultural signifiers of meanings, with symbols and through shared values. Identities are
always contextual, constructed, and relative. But the self is absolute, essential, and
eternal. Identities are a product of "horizontal relationships" of identity
and difference, and the self is the consequence of a "vertical
relationship," which simultaneously posits identity as well as difference.
Multiple identities are possible because multiple others are possible. There are, in a
manner of speaking, as many identities as there are relationships between self and other.
But only one self is possible because there is only one other (God). The primordial self
is the humanized reflection of the exclusive singularity of God. Since there is only one
God, there can be only one other in the vertical dimension and therefore only one true
self. Therefore, in the horizontal realm I can be Muslim, sunni, younger, liberal, and
many more; in the vertical sense, I can only be ‘abd Allah (‘abd
is the opposite of God usually translated as servant or slave).
Having discussed the
distinctions between the divinely constituted self and socially constructed identities, I
now propose to explore the relationship between knowledge and self/identity. Let us, for
example, consider the claim advanced by many philosophers, particularly Dr. Seyyed Hossein
Nasr, that there is such a thing as Islamic philosophy. This claim places identity prior
to philosophy. It is not a product of philosophy. For to claim an Islamic philosophy, is
to assert the existence of an Islamic self which philosophizes without implicating the
self (current discourses on Islamization of thought do not distinguish between self and
identity as I have in this discussion). That is, self and philosophy are forever
separated. Now we are forced to conceptualize self-reflection and reflection as two
mutually exclusive processes. If the self is not a product of philosophical reflection
then what is self-reflection? We are forced to imagine a metaphilosophy of the self, prior
to Islamic philosophy.
Thus when knowledge is a
function of a self or an identity and the process of knowing does not implicate the self
or the identity itself, then we have a knowledge form that is subordinate to the
self/identity. This is not knowledge of things as they are but is knowledge of things as
they relate to the self or identity. An excellent example of this type of knowledge is the
knowledge of Islam that is produced in West by orientalists. The orientalists’
discourse is not knowledge about Islam as it is. It is knowledge of Islam as it relates to
the West. This discourse in understanding Islam seeks to realize Western identity and its
interests while protecting it from potential influence from Islam.
Similarly, when we advance
knowledge forms such as Islamic psychology or Islamic philosophy, these discourses
primarily defend the self/identity of Islam rather than understand things as they are. It
is quite possible that our knowledge of things may reshape our understanding of our
self/identity. For if the West were to understand Islam as it is then it would
simultaneously change their understanding of who they are. The most obvious change that I
can envision is that the West would think of itself as an Abrahamic civilization rather
than a Judeo-Christian one if its knowledge of Islam were more than strategic. The fear
that knowledge, unsubordinated to identity, will transform us, compels us to advance
discourses such as Islamic philosophy or Islamic psychology. We are guarding who we are
when we think, and therefore our thoughts are limited by our conceptions of ourselves.
I believe that if we allow
our identity, which is horizontally constituted with respects to "others" (such
as the West) to shape our discourses, then the knowledge we produce will only serve the
purpose of defending our identity. The constant critique of Western discourses and the
unceasing desire to distinguish between Western and Islamic social sciences or between
Western and Islamic philosophies, is basically a manifestation of our politics—to
maintain the difference between us and them. And because identities are imaginary,
knowledge emerging from these identities too is imaginary.
But while identities are
imaginary, the self is real and unchanging because it emerges and derives its meanings
from the absolute. Knowledge, which is produced to defend this self, will like it to be
real. In conclusion, since what we know is so profoundly linked with who we are, we better
know who we are in order that we may know. We must be very careful to separate our
identities from our self, for identities not only corrupt our self but also influence what
we can know. We can run the risk of allowing our identities to impact our politics but we
must not allow them to implicate our epistemology.
We must learn to eschew the
influence of identities and search for knowledge based upon an understanding of the
primordial self. This knowledge is in many ways the knowledge that speaks about the nature
of the divine and the nature of the self and the relationship between the two. It is a
product of the interaction of our ‘aql (reason/intellection) with revelation
and nature. It is like simultaneously reading two books (revealed and created) authored by
the divine being. Both are mere accumulation of His ayahs (signs). Indeed, the keys
to understanding the secrets of one book may be found in the other. The simultaneous
reading will open more locks to the truth than one can imagine. The knowledge that will
emerge from this simultaneous reading is the knowledge that we seek in endeavors like
Islamic philosophy and Islamic social science A knowledge that is grounded in the
recognition of the primordial self.
What does this relationship
between self and knowledge mean to the intellectual revival of the Islamic civilization?
First of all, it deconstructhe very idea of Islamic civilization as we understand it
today. Islamic civilization as we understand it was not an intended consequence of a
systematic methodology. Nor was it premised on a given Islamic science or Islamic
epistemology. It slowly emerged through a historical process, which was a consequence of a
people's struggle to realize the meaning of their self in social context. What we call
Islamic civilization today got its identity much after Islam’s decline. In its own
time it was a manifestation of itself. The present discussion begs the question of whether
the primordial self exists only in the individual state or also in the collective form? We
shall defer that discussion for another occasion. However, at the moment we must keep in
mind that the idea of a collective self is essential to any discussion of an Islamic or
any other civilization.
Finally, I would like to
suggest that our efforts to reconstruct a glorious Islamic civilization should not be
premised upon our understanding of its identity in history. We must on the contrary
discover it inside us, in the meaning of the self. Therefore, we must reestablish our
connection with the divine and enable the vertical constitution of the self. We must
escape the confines of our horizontal relationships to free knowledge from ideology, and
epistemology from identity. Only then will a civilization emerge that will embody the
Qur’anic verse, nu run ‘ala nu r (light upon light), to which the
identity, Islamic civilization, maybe appropriately attributed.